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Abstract 
While some studies on patenting by public research organisations (PROs) and 
universities altogether tend to be positive and descriptive, normative concerns 
have risen mainly on the side of university patenting. The specific dynamics of 
PROs, e.g. on the growth of their personnel and the creation of research units, 
allow them to make strategic considerations which are less present in universities 
but which may have an impact on patenting. However, PROs are often subject to 
similar requirements and legal frameworks to increase patenting, so the question of 
which factors have a determining influence becomes relevant. Without aiming to 
build a typology, we focus on large PROs that face singular decisions on the 
priority of scientific areas, decentralisation to regions and joint management of their 
research units and we take the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC), the 
largest PRO in Spain, as a case study. We also apply the production function 
approach typical in the case of universities to the context of PROs. The data 
consists of 2 794 patents applied for by the CSIC which we break down among an 
average of 95 CSIC research units per year over 19 years (1987-2005), thus 
creating a database of 1 812 observations. We learn that (i) the application of 
problems and methodologies from universities to PROs is fruitful to formulate/refine 
hypotheses on patent origination; (ii) according to the example of CSIC, returns to 
scale in the production of patents may be higher for PROs than for universities; (iii) 
there may be contradictory logics when PROs try to maximise their objective of 
producing patents. 
Introduction 
Patenting by public research centres (PRCs) has been the focus of some research 
because of some positive and normative concerns1. Positive concerns deal with how to 
promote better commercial application of patentable inventions at PRCs, e.g. in Nordic 
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European countries (Jacob et al., 2003) or point to the evidence that PRCs are only 
marginally engaged in patenting, e.g. in Southern European countries (Cesaroni and 
Piccaluga, 2005). These views tend to refer to universities and public research 
organisations (PROs)2. More normative concerns deal with the possibility that this 
increasing trend of patenting at PRCs could have unforeseen consequences for academic 
research and technology transfer. Such analyses have mainly related to universities and, 
somewhat surprisingly, skipped the other main scientific producer, i.e. PROs. 
Of course, universities are different from PROs and their dynamics may vary, e.g. 
universities have also a teaching mission and their growth depends above all on 
teaching needs while PROs tend to grow according to research needs. However, both 
universities and PROs tend to be subject to a similar legal framework on intellectual 
property rights, e.g. who owns the invention – the institution or the inventor, how they 
share potential income from the license of a patent, etc. Therefore, the significance of 
the normative debates for policy-making in the case of PROs is just as important, since 
similar justifications for changes leading to patenting at PROs may apply in the same 
way as at universities: a natural consequence of shifting patterns of research and an 
attempt to attract attention from industry and society. Actually, the involvement of most 
European universities into patenting is relatively recent and the trend towards increased 
protection of research results may have some margin before unexpected outcomes take 
place, whereas some PROs have a long-standing tradition of patenting and the same 
trend may be counterproductive in a shorter run. 
From an economic perspective, a useful methodological approach to deal with the 
generation of patents by PRCs is the patent production function. It considers the number 
of patents as a function of some economic and contextual factors the influence of which 
we can determine through an econometric estimation. However, in parallel with the lack 
of normative debates at PRO, application has been principally on universities rather 
than PRO (Foltz et al, 2001; Payne and Siow, 2003; Coupé, 2003; Azagra et al., 2003, 
2006, 2007; Calderini et al., 2005; Sapsalis et al., 2006). 
This contribution will try to fill the existing gaps by analysing the origin of patents 
generated by PROs from an economic perspective and thus by applying the normative 
debates on university patenting and the patent production function approach to the 
context of PROs. 
PROs are not homogenous, though. Although building a typology is out of the scope 
of this study, let us present some – tentative – criteria for a distinction among some –
arguable – examples. In many countries, there tends to be a largest PRO with a 
horizontal coverage of many scientific areas (e.g. CNR, CNRS, CSIC, Fraunhofer 
Society, Max Planck Society, TNO, VTT…) and some smaller ones specialised in a few 
scientific areas. Among the largest ones, in some countries they tend to be mainly 
research performers (e.g. CNRS, CSIC, Fraunhofer Society, Max Planck Society, VTT) 
while in some others they also fund research (e.g. CNR, TNO). Even among research 
performers, some have been traditionally project-based research institutions (e.g. 
CNRS, CSIC, Max Planck Society) and some others contract research institutions 
(Fraunhofer Society, VTT). As a starting point, we claim that the analysis of large 
PROs, mainly research performers and traditionally project-based institutions is 
especially interesting. The reasons are that (i) they face singular choices regarding 
priority of scientific areas, decentralisation to regions and joint management of their 
research units – also a difference with universities, (ii) their focus on research 
performance may produce more patents, (iii) they have experienced changes in demand 
and financial constrains that have led them to rely more on contract research. The next 
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section, ‘Influences on patenting’ addresses these issues in some more detail. Then, we 
will take Spain’s CSIC as an example of the kind of PRO we are more interested in. 
Since PROs may encompass several research units, the study will also provide some 
insights into the economics of science using institutions rather than individuals as a unit 
of observation. 
Influences on patenting 
The econometric literature on the determinants of university patent production has 
found it significant the effect of some economic factors (number of researchers, R&D 
expenditure) and contextual factors (scientific areas, regions, legal and institutional 
changes). Concerning the economic factors, we revise the literature on university 
patents and on the broader field of PRO production that can lead us to hypothesise 
similar links in the case of PRO patents. We discuss also some ideas from the 
economics of science that can lead to new hypothesis (e.g. on technological 
cooperation) or the refinement of existing ones (e.g. on types rather than on amount of 
R&D expenditure or number of researchers and partners). Concerning the contextual 
factors, we distinguish contextual factors that may involve decisions on the creation or 
management of research units (a specificity of large, horizontally specialised PROs 
compared to universities and small, vertically specialised PROs) and those that affect all 
research units at the same time (e.g. the legal and institutional framework).3
Economic factors: Human and financial capital 
PROs consist of heterogeneous research units that vary according to the type of 
scientific production, structure of funding or homogeneity of research topics (Joly and 
Mangematin, 1996). Their size also matters, at least for policy-making. Bonaccorsi and 
Daraio (2005) show that in Italy the number of CNR research units drastically decreased 
between 1999 and 2001, with the smallest ones being abandoned in the belief that larger 
ones were more productive. Although there are theoretical bases to support that idea, the 
authors find some evidence that the opposite holds true – using data from 1997. What, 
then, is the effect of size on PRO patents? 
Hypothesis 1. The greater the size of the PROs, the more likely it is that PROs will 
generate patents. 
Let us consider the number of staff as a measure of input labour and size. Another 
source of labour apart from internal staff is cooperation with external partners. Lee and 
Bozeman (2005) discussed and tested the issue of scientific cooperation in an 
econometric setting with regard to its effect on academic publication production. They 
assumed that the number of co-authors in a paper reflected that some cooperation had 
taken place in the past and resulted into a later publication. The research question makes 
sense since in a knowledge-based society, researchers need to search out scattered 
pieces of information for one another and cooperate in order to expand the frontiers of 
understanding. Regarding patents, although networks of academic inventors have been 
studied (Balconi et al., 2004), the impact of this cooperation on patents owned by the 
public science system remains largely unexplored. An exception is the work by Sapsalis 
et al. (2006), who used the number of co-assignees as a proxy of cooperation and found 
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it positively associated to patent value (measured through forward patent citations). The 
impact was strong in the case of public co-assignees and weak or none in the case of 
private co-assignees. The authors did not estimate the impact on patent production or in 
the context of PRO. Therefore, our target question is whether cooperation between 
PROs and other partners fosters patenting and, if so, which kind of partners they are. 
Hypothesis 2. The higher the amount of technological cooperation between PROs and 
selected partners, the more likely it is that PROs will generate patents. 
One issue not tackled in the analysis of public patents is that the composition of staff 
may be also influential from a generation viewpoint. Bonaccorsi and Daraio (2003) find 
that the age structure has a negative effect on scientific productivity, i.e. research units 
with younger people are more productive. This raises the concern that the current trend 
in most European countries of ageing research personnel may be prejudicial. In 
countries like Spain this is caused by paralysation of the creation of tenured positions, 
something that keeps younger scientists out of PROs. However, temporary contracts 
may be seen as positive in increasing flexibility and reducing mismatches with new 
stakeholders’ needs (OECD, 2003: p. 34). Other concerns are whether university 
professors in joint research units are as productive as their scientist colleagues with no 
teaching duties (Carayol and Matt, 2004), or to what extent more management resources 
in terms of administrative staff are useful. Are the current trends of entrenchment of 
research personnel in permanent positions and the switch to university personnel 
conducive to patents? 
Hypothesis 3. Structure of staff matters: the composition of PROs according to their 
status, temporality and affiliation will influence the generation of patents. 
Regarding financial capital, the growth of project vs. institutional public funding is 
widespread among most countries (OECD, 2003: p. 27). In countries like Spain this has 
led to different responses according to the type of PRO (Sanz and Cruz, 2003). There 
has not been much discussion, though, on the different types of project funding with 
regard to the agency supplying the funds. Thus, whereas national projects have been the 
traditional way of obtaining funds, countries joining the European Union gained access 
to supranational projects; moreover, regional administrations developed their own S&T 
policies that increased the amount of local projects. The possible effects on PRO patents 
should not be forgotten. 
Regarding contractual funding, the possibilities of industrial application in growing 
fields of science, combined with the requirements policy-makers impose on new 
stakeholders in terms of providing tangible results (OECD, 2003: p. 8), have induced 
some PRCs to increase working under contract, especially universities and PROs that 
have not been traditionally contract research organisations (e.g. CNRS, CSIC, Max 
Planck Society). While this is one of the bases of conceptual models such as the Triple 
Helix (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000), other authors would argue that this might 
jeopardise curiosity-driven research (Pavitt, 1998). Hence it is interesting to ask what 
effect the increase in different kinds of external funds has on PRO patents. 
Hypothesis 4. Type of funding matters: the amount of PRO activities according to their 
institutional origin (national, international, regional) and competitive origin (project or 
contractual), will influence the generation of patents. 
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In an econometric setting, hypotheses 1, 2 and 4 will lead to the estimation of the 
elasticities of the economic factors. The sum of the elasticities will allow us to test the 
type of returns to scale in the production of PRO patents. If we take university patents 
as a benchmark, there is some evidence of decreasing or constant returns to scale when 
the university, the department or the laboratory is the unit of observation (Coupé, 2003; 
Azagra et al., 2003; Azagra, Carayol and Llerena, 2006) and increasing returns at a 
greater aggregation level – the region (Azagra, Yegros and Archontakis, 2006). Let us 
assume that the behaviour of research units within the PRO is more analogous to the 
sub-regional aggregation level to formulate the next hypothesis. 
Contextual factors on selected research units: Priority of scientific areas, 
decentralisation to regions and joint management of institutions 
Resources do not flow homogenously across scientific areas but are subject to 
evolving priorities over time. In particular, promising fields like new materials, ICT, 
biotechnology or nanotechnology, e.g. areas touching on several disciplines at the same 
time (OECD, 2003: p. 13), have been the main beneficiaries of allocation of funds and 
the creation of research centres. Some authors would argue that a common characteristic 
shared by all these disciplines is that the frontiers between basic and applied matters are 
blurring (Etzkowitz, 1998), so patents should be a natural outcome. We might therefore 
ask ourselves if the priority of scientific areas corresponds to higher patenting in these 
areas.4
Hypothesis 5. PROs will show higher propensity to patent in scientific areas where they 
are actively creating research units. 
In Italy, Bonaccorsi and Daraio (2003) argue that policy-makers have followed a 
strategy of agglomeration of CNR research units in certain geographical areas. This may 
be a specific feature of their country, because in Spain the CSIC no longer sets up 
research units in the country's capital, Madrid, but does so in other regions in line with a 
deliberate strategy. In any case, the authors find no conclusive evidence that regional 
concentration affects scientific production, so we may wonder whether the same applies 
to a related trend – decentralisation: Does decentralisation of research units to regions 
contribute to further patenting? 
Hypothesis 6. PROs will show higher propensity to patent in regions to where they are 
decentralising their research units. 
The creation of research centres poses not only regional questions but also managerial 
issues that analysis of the organisation of science has not debated much. Growing 
specialisation needs may require the birth of different research centres, with the possible 
disadvantage of excessive fragmentation of their parent PRO. In some countries PROs 
are quite flexible in compensating for the disappearance of old centres, e.g. within Max 
Planck in Germany. In other countries, institutions are more persistent and once created 
are difficult to disband. PROs may think of managing them jointly to benefit from 
economies of scale (through the creation of what we will call here "service centres") 
composed of administrative personnel only, e.g. within the CNRS or CSIC. Given that 
patenting involves many administrative procedures, one might imagine that research 
units belonging to a service centre will be able to reduce administration costs and thus 
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patent more. To test this will be another of our target questions: Is the joint management 
of research units a good way of promoting patenting? 
Hypothesis 7. PROs will show higher propensity to patent through research units that 
share a joint management through a service centre. 
Contextual factors common to all research units: Personally and political party-driven 
legal and institutional changes 
It is now common knowledge among European researchers in the field of public 
patents that the Bayh-Dole Act in the USA constituted a major legal change favouring 
patenting activities by public research centres. Its effects have been widely criticised as 
(i) not having that much of an impact, since they may have only assisted an already 
existing trend on the part of universities (Mowery and Sampat, 2001), or (ii) even as 
being prejudicial because they increased the number of lower-quality patents 
(Henderson et al., 1998), probably due to newcomers (Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002). 
Coupé (2003) found in an econometric setting that no significant increase in patents 
could be attributed to the impact of the Bayh-Dole Act. 
Europe has no regulatory watershed equivalent to that Act, and some researchers 
argue whether the European Union’s or other OECD countries’ attempts along these 
lines make sense (Mowery and Sampat, 2003). On a much more modest scale, in their 
case study of a European entrepreneurial university, Azagra et al. (2003) showed that an 
internal legal change had no effect on patents. Other research has pointed out that most 
patents with academic inventors in Europe are not applied for by universities (Azagra, 
Llerena, Carayol, 2006) and that once we take it into account, the differences with 
university patenting in USA are not so big (Dosi et al., 2005). Moreover, both 
university-owned and invented patents produce similar economic results, so no 
additional legislation is needed to make university patenting more attractive in Europe 
(Crespi et al., 2006). 
Although there have been no equivalent lines of research on the effects of the US 
Stevenson-Wydler Act oriented at PROs, let us assume a similar degree of scepticism 
about whether concrete legal changes are effective, with no definitive evidence that they 
are. However, we can still ask whether the political climate has a more subtle impact. 
Such influence in a PRO is based on at least two factors: the term of office of a 
particular PRO Head and that of the government. As far as we are aware, 
econometricians have not tested such a proposition yet. So we wonder: Are particular 
personal leadership styles or governments in power able to induce patenting by PROs? 
Hypothesis 8. Over time, particular personal leadership styles of PROs Heads or 
governments in power make the number of university patents increase. 
The context of the research: CSIC 
As mentioned in the introduction, at without aiming to build a typology, the CNRS, 
the Max Planck Society and the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC) are 
European PROs with some elements in common. These three institutions manage 
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themselves their research budget and human resources. However, we can also find some 
differences: CSIC is smaller regarding the number of scientists and technical staff, the 
amount of research budget and other measures of size that might condition the absolute 
value of the scientific and technological output of each of them. With some exceptions, 
CSIC has been usually a project-based organisation, differing from other European 
PROs that have always been contract research organisations, e.g. Fraunhofer Society or 
VTT. 
The Spanish R&D public system is mainly based in the contributions made by 
Universities and PROs belonging to the Ministry for Education and Science. CSIC is 
one of them, together with other five: CIEMAT (nuclear and environmental research), 
IGME (geology and mining), IEO (oceanography), INIA (agriculture and food) and 
IAC (astrophysics). Other Ministries, such as the Ministry of Health, have their own 
PROs that perform research in medical and health disciplines. Dependent of Ministry of 
Public Works there is CEDEX (materials, hydrology and civil engineering). CSIC is the 
largest public research body in Spain, being a multidisciplinary body that covers all 
fields of knowledge, from basic research to technological development.  
The CSIC was created after the civil war in 1939 (by an act of the 24th of 
November). Six boards went to make up the structure of the CSIC, a situation that 
remained the same until 1977: two dedicated to humanities and social sciences, two to 
animal and plant biology, one to inorganic sciences and, finally, one dedicated to 
technical research (the board known as “Juan de la Cierva Codorníu” or PJC). 
In 1958 the Scientific and Technical Research Advisory Board (CAICYT) was set up, 
a commission that went on to run the Spanish scientific and technological system. The 
change introduced by the CAICYT was to replace the creation of new centres and to act 
via projects and programmes set up directly by state bodies, thereby avoiding the 
delegation of policies to the centres. In 1971, the CAICYT became the link between the 
different public centres of applied research and technology and the Delegate 
Commission for Scientific Policy. 
In 1977, a new internal restructuring was put into practice with the first democratic 
mechanisms, hitherto absent, as well as regulating relations between this institution and 
the Ministry of Education and Science. In 1984, another novelty was introduced in the 
internal life of the CSIC. A Royal Decree established the procedure for creating and 
running institutes and centres of the CSIC directly linked to national scientific and 
technological research programmes. 
1986 is the year of the Act to Promote and Generally Coordinate Scientific and 
Technical Research, the so-called "Science Act". Although this act must also be placed 
in relation to Spain joining the European Economic Community, we must not forget that 
it was the result of the growing awareness of the importance of scientific research for 
Spain. The new design of organisation and control specified by this act not only aimed 
to be more effective, capable of managing the new funding, and at the same time 
capable of handling the start-up of initiatives such as the National Plan for Scientific 
Research and Technological Development in 1978, but this new act also sought to 
provide a response to the new situations arising as a result of the arrival of democracy: 
the new State of the Autonomies and the entrance of Spain into the European Economic 
Community. 
This entrance also induced the Spanish legislation to become compatible with 
European legislation and include regulations that had already been assimilated by the 
other member states. In the case of patents, it had to include what had been approved at 
the Munich Convention of 1973 on European patents and the Luxembourg Convention 
of the 15th December 1975 regarding Community patents. The Patent Act (LP) of 1986 
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therefore regulated the patentability of inventions following European law. This 
regulation is valid for private and public institutions, without distinction between 
universities and PROs. 
Nowadays, CSIC is organised into eight scientific and technical areas: Humanities & 
Social Sciences, Biology & Biomedicine, Natural Resources, Agriculture, Physics, 
Materials, Food, Chemistry. It has more than one hundred research units – 40 of them 
joint research units, mostly with universities – and nine service centres, i.e. an 
institution for the joint management of research units as explained in the section 
“Influences on patenting” before formulating Hypothesis 7.5 There are research units in 
16 out of the 17 Spanish NUTS 2 regions, plus one in Rome, i.e. it has a wide regional 
implantation. CSIC has also ten regional offices and one office in Brussels. 
CSIC principal funding comes from the state general budget. Other support, over 
thirty percent of the total, comes from other sources, with a growing proportion of 
industrial funding. 
Methods 
Patent data come from the CSIC's Technology Transfer Office (TTO) in the form of 
2 794 patents applied for by the CSIC. We broke them down across an average of 95 
CSIC research units per year over 19 years (1987-2005), giving a database of 1 812 
observations. As far as we are aware, this forms one of the largest databases in Europe 
for studying public patents at institutional level. 
We applied count data econometric models in order to assess the determinants of 
different types of CSIC patents. 
Independent variables include those on cooperation patterns from the same TTO 
database: logarithm of number of co-applicants, by type (other CSIC research units6, 
other PROs, universities7, business firms and other institutions) and nationality (national 
and foreign). We adopt Lee and Bozeman’s (2005) approach to the case of publications 
and Sapsalis et al. (2006) to the case of university patents to assume that the number of 
co-applicants in a patent reflects that some technological cooperation has taken place in 
the past and may result into a later patent. This implies that the notion of technological 
cooperation used here includes inventive activity as well as commercial knowledge (i.e. 
once the invention is ready, partners appear to provide financial support to the project 
and market expertise). Still, this measure has the limitation that research and 
technological cooperation may take other forms and we cannot capture them. CSIC 
research units may potentially be conducting some collaboration, but they may not be 
patenting. 
A second database compiled from CSIC memories allows us to include other 
independent variables on the research units’ characteristics. These are total staff (in 
logs) and their composition (proportion of CSIC civil servants, CSIC working staff8, 
university personnel and other staff – mainly temporary), per capita amount of financial 
activities (number of national projects, other projects, contracts, in logs, divided by the 
number of total employees), scientific area9, region10 and being part of a service centre, 
i.e. an institution for the joint management of research units as explained in the section 
“Influences on patenting” before formulating Hypothesis 7. 
Since we are looking at research units, we have to detect the presence of outliers. 
There is one in the sample, the Institute of Chemical Technology (ITQ)11, so we created 
a dummy variable to allow it to have a separate intercept. 
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Finally, we controlled for time differences in terms of the length of each term of 
office of the CSIC's Head under each political party forming the government. There 
were eight CSIC Heads and three political parties in power in Spain during the 
observation period. 
In the independent variables, we are one period behind every year in relation to patent 
application, in order to prevent endogeneity. The exception is co-application, which we 
take in the same year of patent application. However, this should not be a problem, 
since co-application indicates that technological cooperation took place before the 
patent application. 
Results 
Descriptive analysis 
According to Table 1, CSIC patent applications increased 32-fold between 1987 and 
2005. The proportion of co-applicants rose 2-fold and the average number of co- 
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1987 9 22% 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 
1988 19 11% 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1989 45 22% 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.00 
1990 62 37% 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.21 0.05 0.00 
1991 54 41% 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.15 0.07 0.00 
1992 44 45% 0.45 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.16 0.00 
1993 68 41% 0.46 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.22 0.03 0.00 
1994 65 45% 0.63 0.28 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 
1995 57 49% 0.58 0.21 0.02 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.00 
1996 102 53% 0.61 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.04 0.15 0.11 0.01 
1997 142 46% 0.50 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.00 
1998 190 54% 0.69 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.08 0.33 0.06 0.01 
1999 243 28% 0.31 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.00 
2000 238 41% 0.47 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.02 
2001 250 28% 0.42 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.05 
2002 342 38% 0.52 0.19 0.01 0.06 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.02 
2003 316 38% 0.55 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.16 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.04 
2004 251 44% 0.57 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.16 0.06 0.12 0.01 0.05 
2005 296 45% 0.59 0.15 0.07 0.04 0.18 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.04 
Source: CSIC’s TTO 
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applicants rose 3-fold during the same period. The growth is even higher if we take 
1988 as the base year,12 although it concentrated from 1988 to 1998. Many co-
applicants were other CSIC research units and national universities, and their average 
number per patent grew. Cooperation with national firms was also high but it fell. 
Cooperation with other national PROs and all types of foreign institutions is below the 
average. It has grown with other national PROs but not with the rest of institutions, in 
particular with foreign firms. 
Table 2 shows that CSIC total staff in 2004 is twofold what it was in 1986. Whereas 
the proportion of civil servants was over half at the beginning of the period, it had fallen 
to one third by the end. Although from lower absolute values, the decline in CSIC 
working staff was similar. Compensation comes from two sources. The first is the 
growth in university personnel, which also reflects the emphasis on creating joint 
research units with universities. The second and more important source is the increase 
in other personnel, making up almost half of the total nowadays. This category covers 
researchers funded by institutions other than the CSIC, with a more or less stable 
relation with CSIC, and also grant holders whose continuity is not guaranteed, i.e. it 
covers the bulk of temporary links with the institution. 
The last three columns of Table 2 show that all types of R&D activity increased over 
the observation period. The number of national projects grew as much as the number of 
contracts did (in both cases increasing 2.2-fold), so we cannot confirm neither the view 
that the CSIC substituted the former for the latter neither the opposite13. It should also 
be noted that the highest growth occurs among other projects (up 3.6-fold) consisting of 
international, European and regional measures. This means that project-based activities 
have diversified their sources of funding at the CSIC. 
Table 2. CSIC human and financial resources 
Year Total 
staff 
% of 
CSIC 
civil 
servants 
% of 
CSIC 
working 
staff 
% of 
university 
personnel 
% of 
other 
personnel 
National 
projects 
per 
capita 
Other 
projects 
per 
capita 
Contracts 
per 
capita 
1986 6 270 56% 14% 6% 24% 0.08 0.04 0.05 
1987 7 245 52% 13% 6% 29% 0.07 0.02 0.04 
1988 7 957 48% 13% 6% 33% 0.08 0.04 0.04 
1989 7 898 48% 13% 6% 33% 0.09 0.05 0.05 
1990 7 862 49% 12% 7% 32% 0.10 0.05 0.05 
1991 8 175 48% 12% 6% 34% 0.11 0.05 0.07 
1992 8 742 46% 11% 6% 37% 0.11 0.07 0.10 
1993 8 257 47% 12% 6% 35% 0.11 0.09 0.06 
1994 8 433 47% 11% 6% 37% 0.14 0.10 0.09 
1995 8 720 44% 10% 6% 39% 0.13 0.11 0.08 
1996 9 654 41% 9% 7% 43% 0.13 0.13 0.10 
1997 10 157 39% 8% 6% 47% 0.14 0.14 0.07 
1998 10 398 38% 8% 6% 49% 0.14 0.15 0.08 
1999 10 762 37% 10% 8% 45% 0.15 0.18 0.08 
2000 11 500 36% 10% 8% 45% 0.15 0.17 0.09 
2001 11 771 35% 13% 9% 44% 0.16 0.16 0.08 
2002 11 707 35% 9% 9% 46% 0.16 0.15 0.11 
2003 12 749 34% 8% 9% 49% 0.17 0.15 0.12 
2004 12 989 33% 9% 10% 49% 0.17 0.15 0.11 
Source: CSIC memories 1986-2004 
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The priority of some research areas was moderate but still present at the CSIC, if 
measured by the number of research units. In Table 3 we can see that in two areas, 
Biology & Biomedicine and Physics, the number of centres grew above the average. 
Humanities & Social Sciences and Food grew about the average. Natural Resources, 
Materials and Chemistry increased a bit less. Agriculture is the only area that declined. 
Table 3. CSIC research units by scientific area 
Year Humanities 
& Social 
Sciences 
Biology & 
Biomedicine 
Natural 
Resources 
Agriculture Physics Materials Food Chemistry 
1986 14 10 14 13 13 7 4 9 
1987 13 10 14 13 12 8 5 9 
1988 14 12 16 14 12 8 5 9 
1989 12 13 16 14 12 8 6 9 
1990 13 12 16 14 13 7 6 10 
1991 12 11 16 13 13 8 6 10 
1992 12 11 16 11 12 8 6 11 
1993 12 11 16 11 11 8 6 9 
1994 13 12 16 11 10 8 6 10 
1995 13 12 17 11 12 8 6 9 
1996 14 13 17 11 15 8 6 11 
1997 14 13 17 11 15 8 6 11 
1998 14 15 17 11 15 8 6 11 
1999 16 17 17 12 19 9 6 11 
2000 17 18 17 12 19 9 6 11 
2001 17 18 17 11 19 9 5 11 
2002 17 18 17 9 19 9 5 11 
2003 18 20 17 12 21 9 5 11 
2004 18 20 16 12 21 8 5 11 
Source: CSIC memories 1986-2004 
The CSIC's decentralisation strategy can be seen in Table 4, where columns 2 and 3 
show how the number of research units in the capital, Madrid, fluctuated around 38 and 
then stabilised by the end of the period, whereas for the remaining regions it steadily 
increased and finally went up 1.6-fold. In a similar fashion, as columns 4 and 5 show, 
while the number of research units that continue to be managed on their own has 
scarcely risen, the number of research units becoming part of a service centre grew 
almost four times. 
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Table 4. CSIC research units by region and integration into a service centre 
Year Madrid Other regions Single research units Research units, part of 
a service centre 
1986 39 45 78 6 
1987 39 45 78 6 
1988 40 50 84 6 
1989 40 50 84 6 
1990 39 52 85 6 
1991 37 52 82 7 
1992 36 51 80 7 
1993 36 48 77 7 
1994 35 51 76 10 
1995 36 52 77 11 
1996 37 58 78 17 
1997 37 58 78 17 
1998 37 60 78 19 
1999 39 68 85 22 
2000 39 70 87 22 
2001 38 69 84 23 
2002 38 67 82 23 
2003 40 73 90 23 
2004 39 72 88 23 
Source: CSIC memories 1986-2004 
The evolution of the CSIC under the term of office of its different Heads 
('Presidencies') and the parties in government appears in Table 5, where we divided the 
number of months by twelve (the maximum of twelve months per year is equal to 1). 
Presidents Nos 1 to 4 are in office under Party 1 until 1995. In 1996, President No 4 
continues for three months under Party 1, then Party 2 wins the elections and President 
No 4 stays four months longer, but then he resigns. President No 5 enters the CSIC for 
the remaining five months of 1996 under Party 2. Presidents Nos 5 to 7 hold office 
under this party until 2004. In 2004, Party 1 comes back to power after new elections, 
President No 7 resigns and President No 8 takes over. We should explain that the two 
dominant parties in the period, Party 1 and Party 2, have different political leanings: 
while Party 1 is more left-oriented, Party 2 is more right-oriented. Testing whether one 
has a greater impact than the other on the production of CSIC patents is a proxy to test 
whether ideological differences matter. 
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Table 5. Length of CSIC Presidencies by party in government 
 Pres1_ Party1 
Pres2_ 
Party1 
Pres3_ 
Party1 
Pres4_ 
Party1 
Pres4_ 
Party2 
Pres5_ 
Party2 
Pres6_ 
Party2 
Pres7_ 
Party2 
Pres7_ 
Party1 
Pres8_ 
Party1 
1986 1.00          
1987 1.00          
1988 0.75 0.25         
1989  1.00         
1990  1.00         
1991  0.50 0.50        
1992   0.58 0.42       
1993    1.00       
1994    1.00       
1995    1.00       
1996    0.25 0.33 0.42     
1997      1.00     
1998      1.00     
1999      1.00     
2000      0.67 0.33    
2001       1.00    
2002       1.00    
2003       0.17 0.83   
2004        0.25 0.08 0.67 
Source: own elaboration 
 Regression analysis 
According to the econometric estimates in Table 6, we start by running a Poisson 
regression that shows significant results according to the Pearson test and a fit around 
70%. 
The overdispersion tests suggest that a negative binomial specification may suit 
better; when we run it, the log likelihood function improves and the results are still 
significant. However, the Vuong statistic provides evidence that a zero-inflated model 
will be more adequate, and so we present these results. The log likelihood function 
improves again, the significant α parameter supports the idea that overdispersion is 
actually present and the significant τ parameter reinforces the detection of an excess of 
zeros. 
Following the zero-inflated negative binomial model, the higher the number of total 
staff, the more likely it is that CSIC research units generate patents.  
The elasticity of the number of total staff is positive and significant, which provides 
evidence in favour of Hypothesis 1. Co-application with other national PROs and (either 
national or foreign) business firms has the largest, positive, effect on patent production. 
Having other CSIC research units, Spanish universities and foreign PROs as co-
applicants also enhances patent production, but to a lesser extent.14 Co-application with 
foreign universities and other institutions does not significantly affect the production of 
CSIC patents. Overall, we find evidence to support Hypothesis 2. 
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Research units with a higher proportion of CSIC civil servants (42% on average) 
patent as much as those with a higher proportion of other personnel – the benchmark 
(38% on average). Research units with a higher proportion of CSIC working staff (10% 
on average) and university personnel (10% on average) patent significantly less than the 
former.15 No particular kind of per capita number of funding measures is conducive to 
more patents. To sum up, the estimations support Hypothesis 3 but not Hypothesis 4. 
The economic factors with significant effects are therefore the number of total staff 
and of most types of collaborators. The sum of their coefficients is much larger than 
one, so the generation of CSIC patents presents increasing returns to scale. 
It is important to control for differences across scientific areas, since some have a 
higher propensity to patent, and this is the ranking: Chemistry, Food and Materials 
patent more than average; Physics, Biology & Biomedicine and Agriculture represent 
the average; Natural Resources patent less than average. Note that this is not exactly the 
same ranking depicted by the crude numbers from Table 3. The reason is that after 
discounting the higher allocation of some inputs, e.g. number of staff and collaborators, 
the propensity to patent is not so high. Therefore, Hypothesis 5 finds only partial 
support in the case of CSIC. 
Regional variation does not seem to affect patenting, with only one exception 
(Andalusia shows a higher propensity to apply for patents). Being part of a service 
centre is significantly positive for patenting. In other words, Hypothesis 6 does not hold 
while Hypothesis 7 holds. 
ITQ is actually an outlier and we need to control its propensity to apply for patents in 
order to moderate the impact of other effects. The significant, positive sign we find 
indicates that it stands out from other research units. 
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Table 6. Determinants of the number of CSIC patents by research unit and year 
Dependent variable Number of CSIC patents 
 Poisson Regression 
Number of observations  1 812 
Log likelihood function  -2 253.88 
Prob[χ2>value] = 0.00 
Adjusted R2 0.73 
Overdispersion tests: g=µ(i) 6.02 
Overdispersion tests: g= µ(i)2 5.56 
 Negative Binomial Regression 
Log likelihood function -1 867.73 
Prob[χ2>value] = 0.00 
 Zero Altered Neg. Binomial Regression Model 
Log likelihood function -1 803.13 
Vuong statistic  4.88 
  
 Coefficient (t-ratio) 
Constant -2.68 (-9.31) ** 
Human capital  
Total staff 0.56 (10.25) ** 
Proportion of CSIC civil servants 0.22 (1.26) 
Proportion of CSIC working staff -1.27 (-3.79) ** 
Proportion of university personnel -0.77 (-3.16) ** 
Technological cooperation with  
Other CSIC research units 0.4 (3.56) ** 
Other national PROs 0.73 (2.26) * 
Foreign PROs 0.4 (2.36) ** 
National universities 0.47 (4.89) ** 
Foreign universities 0.39 (1.8) 
National business firms 0.74 (7.87) ** 
Foreign business firms 0.65 (2.44) ** 
Other institutions 0.09 (0.16) 
Financial capital  
National projects 0.05 (1.19) 
Other projects 0.04 (1.63) 
Contracts 0 (-0.05) 
Scientific area  
Chemistry 0.61 (7.35) ** 
Food 0.57 (5.14) ** 
Materials 0.46 (5.49) ** 
Agriculture 0.1 (1.07) 
Natural resources -0.28 (-3.58) ** 
Region  
Andalusia 0.29 (2.48) ** 
Valencian Community 0.22 (1.47) 
Madrid 0.14 (1.13) 
Asturias 0.24 (0.84) 
Catalonia -0.01 (-0.08) 
Galicia -0.01 (-0.07) 
Aragon -0.02 (-0.15) 
Murcia -0.14 (-0.56) 
Canary Islands -0.19 (-0.77) 
Service centre 0.4 (6.16) ** 
ITQ 2.73 (12.98) ** 
CSIC President_Party in the government  
Pres1_Party1 -0.28 (-2.67) ** 
Pres2_Party1 0.03 (0.32) 
Pres3_Party1 -0.13 (-0.74) 
Pres4_Party2 0.07 (0.21) 
Pres5_Party2 0.28 (3.53) ** 
Pres6_Party2 0.46 (5.04) ** 
Pres7_Party2 0.33 (2.75) ** 
Pres8_Party1 0.5 (3.46) ** 
α 0.51 (8.02) ** 
τ -2.89 (-8.3) ** 
** Significant at 1%. * Significant at 5% 
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The effect of successive CSIC Presidencies allows us to distinguish between two sub-
periods over the observation period: the propensity to patent at CSIC research units 
significantly increased from the fifth President onwards. Under President No 4 patents 
were the same regardless of whether Parties 1 or 2 were in government.16 Moreover, the 
increase in patents continued at the end of the period no matter whether Party 2 or 1 was 
in power. This leads us to think that changes of government did not have an influence. 
Thus, the evidence is supportive of Hypothesis 8 concerning the presidency of CSIC but 
not concerning the government in the power. 
Conclusions and limitations 
The above results imply that despite some evidence in favour of decreasing or 
constant returns to scale of size to patents at universities, there appears to be increasing 
return to scale at PROs like CSIC. This may be because departments or labs at 
universities or universities themselves grow due to teaching duties, which do not head 
to more research results like patents. PROs, though, tend to augment their size because 
of R&D requirements than may lead to a convenient accumulation of critical mass. 
However, the case of CSIC may be idiosyncratic because it is smaller than some 
European homologous PROs. 
The findings also show that higher patenting by PROs such as the CSIC results from 
another increasing trend, namely that of technological cooperation, or at least 
cooperation indicated by patent co-application. If the latter is desirable, we should not 
regard patents by PROs as being prejudicial to academic production. However, policy-
makers and PROs should be aware that some partners are more conducive to patent 
production than others – in order to check whether this is the outcome of a conscious 
strategy. On the one hand, cooperation has grown with other national PROs and this is 
advantageous for patents, but it has also grown within CSIC research units and national 
universities, which is less helpful. On the other hand, cooperation has decreased with 
national and foreign firms, which would be more advantageous for patents. We must 
keep in mind that our measure of technological cooperation does not necessarily imply 
inventive activity but maybe commercial knowledge. Actually, our ongoing work by 
suggests that CSIC sometimes contacts co-applicants to internationally extend the 
original national application (Romero and Azagra, 2007). In any case, our study would 
benefit from a metric of co-operation other than that expressed by the number of co-
applicants from patent records, e.g., indicators on partnerships in research grants and 
contracts, which are not publicly accessible. 
By contrast, the current entrenchment of research personnel in permanent positions 
and the growth in university personnel are not coherent with an emphasis on patenting. 
So either more permanent positions should be opened at PROs like the CSIC, or patents 
should be considered a less relevant indicator of performance at research units with a 
lower proportion of permanent staff. The tendency towards an increase in other – 
mainly temporary – personnel appears to be more conducive, which suggests that the 
injection of new ideas is helpful. Our future work should nevertheless refine the 
distinctions among categories. 
On the other hand, the trend towards increased contractual versus granted funding is 
neither advantageous nor detrimental for patent production. Perhaps the smaller growth 
in cutting-edge, more costly R&D funded through grants and probably leading to more 
inventiveness cancels out the higher growth in problem-solving, less costly R&D 
funded through contracts and probably leading to higher levels of industrial application. 
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Of course, one limitation of the present work is that we did not have data on the value 
but on the amount of funding activities. 
Regional decentralisation has not contributed to further patenting by CSIC research 
units, so we should look carefully at why the two phenomena are not complementary. In 
any case, the joint management of research units through service centres and other 
cultural changes promoted by the leadership style of the Heads of PROs such as the 
CSIC appear to be beneficial. Not so regarding government action, which seems not to 
have an impact, perhaps because the rhetoric common to left- and right-oriented parties 
does not encompass different measures on PRO patents. Ongoing research is providing 
a historical perspective in order to boost understanding of the institutional policies and 
scientific background that influence patenting initiatives (Azagra and Romero, 2006). A 
tentative explanation is that once the general IPR framework was set in 1986 (see 
section ‘The context of research’), the presidential style of CSIC assumed these cultural 
changes – so it could be seen as a reactive rather than an active initiative. On turn, the 
changes were solid enough as to be independent of later rotations of the political party 
in the government.  
This study is part of a larger project on CSIC patents. Future research will also study 
patents held by CSIC inventors not applied for by the CSIC and it will analyse 
technology transfer through CSIC patents. 
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1 We will deal with patents applied for by public research centres. For patents with university 
inventors applied for by other institutions, see Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch (1998), Meyer 
(2006), Calderini et al. (2004) and Azagra, Carayol and Llerena (2006). 
2 Since the terminology used to refer to the different kinds of institution treated in this study 
is not standardised, we propose the following conventions: a) public research centres = 
universities + PROs; b) PROs consist of "research units" (e.g. institutes, centres, laboratories, 
departments, etc.) 
3 This is not to say that there are no more internal determinants of university patenting. Foltz 
et al (2001) and Coupé (2003) include a measure of faculty quality (average wage). Foltz et al. 
(2001), Agrawal and Henderson (2002) and Baldini et al. (2004) include a measure of patenting 
experience. 
4 At all events it is important to control for disciplinary variation since some of them may 
show different propensities to patent. In the case of universities, it is widely accepted that 
patents in the USA are a phenomenon of a number of disciplines, e.g. chemistry, drugs, 
biotechnology and ICT (Henderson et al., 1998, Jaffe, 2000). However, according to national 
idiosyncrasies (Pavitt, 1998), there might be some other leading disciplines in patenting, e.g. 
mechanical engineering in Germany (Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch, 1998). For single 
universities, the distribution by patenting disciplines may not be homogenous (Wallmark, 1998, 
Azagra et al, 2003, 2006). On the other hand, there are disciplines such as social sciences and 
humanities that do not produce physical technologies and thus are not likely to apply for 
patents. Other disciplines have legal restrictions on patenting (e.g. mathematics or software). 
5 Let us give two examples: 1) The Centre of Organic Chemistry “Lora Tamayo” is composed 
by the Institute of Polymer Science and Technology, the Institute of Industrial Fermentations, 
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the Institute of Medical Chemistry and the Institute of General Organic Chemistry. According to 
its webpage (http://www.cenquior.csic.es/), the objective of the centre is “to cover the needs on 
large instrumental equipment, library, technical services, management of the building and its 
installations”. 2) The Physic Technologies Centre “L. Torres Quevedo” is composed by the 
Institute of Acoustics, the Institute of Industrial Automatics and the Institute of Applied Physics. 
According to its web page (http://www.cetef.csic.es/), it was created to “gather the technological 
activity of the three institutes, coordinate their research and achieve the appropriate synergy and 
critical mass”. 
6 In this case, they are not co-applicants, but co-inventors, because when CSIC research units 
apply for a patent, CSIC is the applicant, not the research unit itself. 
7 According to Spanish law, patents applied for by joint centres have both the CSIC and 
universities as the assignees. We consider technological cooperation to have taken place only 
when CSIC research units apply for a patent together with a university of which they are not a 
part. Therefore, we checked one by one the cases of co-applications by the CSIC and 
universities and counted just those in the latter situation.  
8 There are some differences between CSIC civil servants and working staff. CSIC civil 
servants hold a permanent position. This category is mainly constituted by researchers, 
technicians and research assistants. There are also some administrative staff. CSIC working 
staff hold either a permanent or a temporary position, regulated by general labour statutes. There 
is a predominance of computer experts, librarians, porters, farmers and cattle-raisers in 
experimental stations, etc. 
9 We take Physics, Biology & Biomedicine and Humanities & Social Sciences as a 
benchmark.  
10 At first we refer to the 17 Spanish NUTS 2 regions: Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, Balearic 
Islands, Basque Country, Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, Castile-Leon, 
Catalonia, Extremadura, Galicia, Madrid, Murcia, Navarre, Rioja and Valencian Community. 
Taking into account that the CSIC has no research units in Rioja but one outside Spain, in 
Rome, we would still have 17 regions. However, research units in six regions do not have 
patents: Cantabria, Basque Country, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura, Navarre and Rome, so it 
leaves us with 11 regions. We take Castile-Leon and Balearic Islands as a benchmark. 
11 ITQ holds 20% of all patent applications. The next research unit holds just 8%. 
12 Another way to see this is that in 69% of our observations, CSIC research units did not 
apply for a patent. When they applied, 63% did it in cooperation. 
13 We believe that with the value rather than with the number of contracts this substitution 
effect would be captured, since it is observable for CSIC as a whole. However, data at research 
unit level is not publicly available. We also believe that even with the number of contracts the 
effect would have been more notorious before the period of observation. 
14 At the 5% significance level, the coefficients of the three former categories are not different 
from 0.9; while the coefficients of the three latter categories are smaller than 0.9. 
15 Carayol and Matt (2004) find that the combination of permanent and temporary researchers 
enhances patenting and so does the combination of full-time researchers and university 
professors – at least in their Class 4 labs. Our results lead us to agree with the former but not 
with the latter. More evidence on the negative trade-off between teaching and research is 
contained in Azagra, Yegros and Archontakis (2006), where one of us found that the presence 
of joint research centres was not enough for universities to patent more. It seems that mixing 
research with teaching has advantages and costs, and the outcome depends on the context 
(Martin, 2003). 
16 Pres4_Party2 is the benchmark. 
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